A1: The upper house election delivered a setback to Japan’s ruling LDP, which lost its majority in both chambers for the first time since its founding in 1955, and now faces greater political constraints. Out of the 248 seats in the upper house, 125 seats were contested. The LDP won 39 seats, and Komeito won 8 seats. Combined with the 75 seats that were not up for reelection, the ruling coalition now holds 122 seats, falling short of a majority. Smaller parties made the most notable gains. The Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), a center-right group with economic policies such as proposed increases in take-home pay popular among younger voters, won 17 seats and increased its total to 22. Sanseito, a far-right party that surged ahead of election day with a nativist platform (and generated controversy when one of its candidates granted an interview with Sputnik, heightening concerns about Russian disinformation campaigns on social media), increased its total to 15 seats. The Conservative Party of Japan campaigned on a platform similar to Sanseito and captured its first two seats in the upper house. In contrast, the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) maintained its previous seat count, showing limited success in capitalizing on voter dissatisfaction.
The 17-day election campaign focused overwhelmingly on domestic economic issues. Inflation topped voter concerns, followed by social security, pensions, and general concerns about the economy. As election day neared, the debates broadened to include immigration and U.S. tariffs. Voter turnout was notably high at 58.5 percent, up 6.5 points from the 2022 upper house election, including a record 26 million early votes—a 33 percent increase from 2022. This surge in public engagement may have contributed to the setbacks faced by the incumbent LDP and Komeito and to the gains made by opposition parties. While the ruling coalition clearly suffered a defeat, the outcome was not as severe as some worst-case projections, which had the coalition falling short by as many as 18 seats. But with the LDP-Komeito coalition now reliant on support from opposition groups to advance legislation in both chambers, the smaller parties that gained ground in this election may wield greater leverage in shaping policy debates.
Q2: Why did the ruling coalition lose?
A2: Several factors contributed to the LDP-Komeito coalition’s electoral setback. First, the Ishiba government was unable to address mounting public frustration over the economy and rising prices, particularly for staples like rice. A ¥20,000 ($135) cash handout (plus an additional ¥20,000 for children under the age of 18 and low-income households) proposed by the ruling coalition failed to resonate with Japanese voters, with only 17.9 percent support. In contrast, a consumption tax cut pushed by some opposition parties had 76.7 percent public support.
Second, while the LDP’s 2024 political funds scandal no longer dominates the headlines, it continues to cast a shadow over the party and undermine trust in government. A Kyodo News survey in early July found that over half of respondents cited it as a factor in their vote. Although the LDP has tried to address voter concerns by abolishing factions and promising reform, the effects of this scandal have had lingering impacts on the party’s support.
Third, the election results reflect the longer-term trend of the LDP’s weakening grip on its conservative support base. This shift, underway over several election cycles, appeared to deepen under Ishiba and his predecessor Fumio Kishida, both viewed as moderates by the party’s traditional right flank. Sanseito was able to appeal to some frustrated conservative voters with its nationalist, antiestablishment message and “Japanese First” slogan. Both Sanseito and Democratic Party for the People—often described as populist for their appeals to public frustration with the status quo and their skillful use of social media to expand their reach—also drew support from voters seeking an alternative to both the LDP and the CDPJ, a more mainstream opposition party.
Fourth, Komeito—the LDP’s longtime coalition partner—struggled to retain seats, which also reflects broader shifts among voters. Although Komeito has had a long history of consistent success at the polls due to the organizational backing of the religious group Soka Gakkai, its weak performance reflected the declining influence of its aging support base. Taken together, these trends signal not only immediate challenges for the ruling coalition but also deeper structural changes in the electorate that could favor new political parties going forward.
Q3: What happens next?
A3: Prime Minister Ishiba has so far signaled his intent to continue leading the minority government, citing the importance of continuity to manage critical issues such as the ongoing trade negotiations with the United States, which are expected to intensify ahead of an August 1 deadline for negotiations set by President Trump. However, some members of the LDP have already called on Ishiba to resign. While the opposition parties have momentum, the diversity of their policy positions and ideologies will complicate their efforts to coalesce around a cohesive alternative policy agenda.
The Diet is expected to reconvene in early August to elect the speaker and vice-speaker of the upper house, and again in late September to consider a supplemental budget incorporating campaign pledges to boost the economy. With the LDP and Komeito now a minority in both houses of parliament, they must make even greater efforts to reach out to opposition parties, adding another layer of political complexity to the policymaking process. Until now, the LDP-Komeito coalition has relied on case-by-case cooperation with opposition groups to advance legislation in the lower house, but with a minority government likely to persist, this ad-hoc approach may no longer suffice. It remains to be seen if a more durable framework for cross-party governance will emerge in the coming months.
Q4: What are the implications for Japanese foreign policy and U.S.-Japan relations?
A4: This electoral upset comes amid multiple challenges for Japanese foreign policy. The loss of the ruling coalition is likely to pull the focus of the Japanese government toward the domestic arena as multiple parties compete to influence policy, and these domestic factors could limit the flexibility and capacity of the Japanese government to deal with external issues at a time when quick, decisive leadership is at a premium. For example, faced with ongoing tariff negotiations with the United States, divisions within the Japanese government may make it more difficult to make controversial concessions on issues such as rice and automobiles, slowing discussions and potentially resulting in missed opportunities. However, the basic direction of Japanese foreign policy is unlikely to change dramatically in the near term due to the general recognition among policymakers of the importance of strong U.S.-Japan relations to meet the challenges posed by China, North Korea, and Russia. And polls suggest that there is support among policymakers in multiple parties for continuing the current government’s policy of increasing defense spending to two percent of GDP by 2027 to meet those challenges. In short, Japan’s strategic trajectory will likely stay on course, but domestic political constraints may adversely affect the pace at which Japan implements key foreign policy objectives. Trend lines will become clearer in the next few weeks once the political dust settles.
Nicholas Szechenyi is vice president of the geopolitics and foreign policy department and senior fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Yuko Nakano is a fellow with the Japan Chair and associate director of the U.S.-Japan Strategic Leadership Program at CSIS. Kristi Govella is senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS.
